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The Origins of and Economic
Momentum Behind “Pay for
Performance” Reimbursement
Rick Mayes

Abstract
“Pay for performance,” a reimbursement method under
which some physicians and hospitals are paid more than others for the same services because they have been deemed to
deliver better quality care and their patients appear to have
better outcomes, is enormously controversial. Disputes
invariably arise over how “quality” should (or even can) be
measured. Nevertheless, differentiating between medical
providers, financially, lies at the heart of this new reimbursement innovation developed by insurance companies
and employers. Its two main objectives are: (1) to increase
the overall quality of health care that patients receive, and
(2) to encourage behavioral change on the part of physicians
and hospitals that leads to increased efficiency. This article
attempts to explain where the momentum for “pay for performance” reimbursement has come from, why its advocates consider it an improvement upon existing payment
systems, and how it can both positively and negatively
affect medical providers.
The majority of health care spending in the U.S., argues
health economist David Cutler, is good. Rather than pay
less, he maintains that we as a nation should pay for more
medical care, albeit wisely.1 Unfortunately, getting additional value from increased medical spending is difficult
under the current models of reimbursement. The three worst
payment mechanisms for rewarding quality and performance, jokes health economist Jamie Robinson, are: (a)
fee-for-service, (b) capitation, and (c) salary.2 What all three
of these models have in common is that, financially, they
generally treat most physicians and hospitals the same
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regardless of their patients’ outcomes.3 “Pay for performance,” then, is principally an effort by a growing number
of employers and insurers to find new ways to pay medical
providers that increases the value and quality of the health
care that they purchase, as well as the efficiency with which
it is provided.4 Two landmark reports by the Institute of
Medicine [IOM]—To Err is Human (2000) and Crossing
the Quality Chasm (2001)—put health care quality and
patient safety issues squarely on the public policy agenda.5
The 2000 report estimated that as many as 98,000 patients
die annually in U.S. hospitals due to preventable medical
errors. The statistic was made more visceral when the
report’s authors noted that this was equivalent to a 300-passenger airplane crashing almost daily in the U.S.6
The IOM reports raised the profile of an initiative closely
related to “pay for performance” reimbursement, which
goes far beyond just improving hospital safety. It is critical
for medical providers to understand what this initiative is
and how accumulating evidence over the last three decades
have shaped its development. The initiative is to reduce
unwarranted geographic variation in both the volume and
variety of medical care provided, while at the same time
increasing the kinds of care that clearly work and improve
patients’ health.7

Economic & Epidemiological
Origins
Key to understanding why efforts to reduce unwarranted
medical variation and “pay for performance” reimburse-
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ment are closely inter-connected is to recognize that there is
forces in our economy.14 In short, the substantial differences
no one single American health care system. There are,
in health care spending that exist across the country are disinstead, hundreds of regional health care systems across the
proportionately related to the number of specialists, hospital
country; and each one has its own unique approache to
beds and technology available.15
patient care and medical spending. Where you live has a significant effect on which (and how many) physicians you see,
While most physicians exemplify the professional and altruhow many days you spend in the hospital (if any), and what
istic virtues that the general public both expects and deeply
drugs you are (or are not) prescribed.8 The realization of this
admires, they are also humans who respond rationally to
existing financial incentives.16 Moreover, they usually have
fact, like so many other discoveries in the field of medicine,
had a serendipitous quality to it. In rural Vermont in the
significant medical education debt, at least early in their
early 1970s, a Dartmouth phycareers, and/or sizeable practice
sician by the name of John
expenses that they must
Wennberg discovered a medifinance.17 Therefore, if an area
cal peculiarity. In a very
of the country has many speIn short, the substantial differences
homogenous part of the councialists, patients tend to see
try, doctors in two nearby towns
them more often.18 If hospitals
in health care spending that
with similar characteristics
in an area have a surplus of
exist across the country are
appeared to have adopted
beds, more patients invariably
wildly different practice styles.
tend to spend more time in
disproportionately related to
In one town, 70 percent of the
them.19 There are so many
the number of specialists,
children had had their tonsils
Medicare patients in New York
removed by age 12; in the other,
City and parts of Florida, for
hospital beds and technology
the figure was only 20 percent.9
example, that doctors (particuavailable.
larly specialists) have always
had a strong incentive to locate
Intrigued, Wennberg and many
there.20 Once established in
of his colleagues at Dartmouth
and elsewhere have spent the
these types of locations, they
better part of the last three
would be going against their
decades documenting similarly dramatic geographic variaown self-interest if they did not try to keep themselves busy.
tions in far more serious cases: mastectomies, coroEssentially, supply creates its own demand, because physinary-bypass surgeries, and radical prostatectomies, to name
cians are rational economic agents and—given the structure
a few.10 Other “small-area large-variation” studies have
of current healthcare financing—they ordinarily act rationally to maximize their revenue.21 And ensuring that
found that the number of cesarean sections is often much
higher in low birth-rate counties than in high birth-rate
patients receive properly integrated and managed care with
counties, even after controlling for a variety of factors (such
an abundance of proven preventative care is ordinarily not
as differences in local prices or rates of illness) that could
lucrative for medical providers in terms of their reimburseexplain this disparity.11 Medicare administrators have disment from private or public payers (health insurers,
Medicare, Medicaid).22
covered that the program pays twice as much per patient in
Miami as it does in Minneapolis, yet the Miami patients do
not live longer than the Minneapolis patients, nor are they
In an effort to improve patient outcomes, “pay for perforhealthier.12
mance” schemes often try to increase the amount of high
Researchers and insurers have deduced two things from
these and other similar findings. First, physician practice
styles are often influenced nearly as much by local factors—such as collaboration, referral and the number of competitors—as they are by what medical treatments have been
scientifically validated (“evidence-based”).13 And, second,
when it comes to medicine, supply generally creates its own
demand, which runs counter to the ordinary competitive
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quality preventative care.23 Ten to twenty years ago, there
was no widely agreed-upon methodology for measuring the
quality of health care.24 It used to be assumed that differences among hospitals or doctors in a particular specialty
were generally insignificant.25 If one plotted a graph showing the patient outcomes of all the centers that treated diabetes or heart disease—or most any other condition for that
matter—people expected that the curve would look something like a shark fin, with most places clustered around the
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very best patient outcomes.26 But mounting evidence has
begun to indicate otherwise. What one tends to find instead
is a bell curve: a number of medical providers with shockingly poor outcomes for their patients, a roughly equal number on the other side of the curve with extraordinarily good
results, and a large “average” middle.27

which complicates assigning them to any one “pay for performance” quality or outcome-based measure.32

Fortunately for hospitals, physicians, and practice managers, existing “pay for performance” models tend to only pay
more for the best providers: all those either above a specific
threshold or percentile ranking in terms of their patients’
care and outcomes.33 They currently do not single out any
The growing ability to measure patients’ outcomes, and the
subsequent discovery that they vary more than previously
specific minority of providers for lower payment. Furtherassumed, has contributed to the popularity of “pay for permore, physicians and hospitals that already meet a standard
formance”
reimbursement
(e.g., an 80 percent childhood
because it would allow health
immunization rate or a 100 perplans and employers to do three
cent administration of aspirin to
If publishing K-12 educational test
things simultaneously: (a) pay
patients who present with myomore to medical providers with
cardial infarction), usually need
scores and “on-time arrival” statistics
the best patient outcomes, (b)
only maintain their status quo to
is considered a good idea for
encourage the majority of medireceive
performance-related
cal providers with average outbonus payments.34 Finally, the
encouraging local schools and
comes to find ways of
percent of a physician’s overall
airlines to improve their performance,
improving, and (c) pay less to
revenue that is at stake is rarely
medical providers with the
more than 10 percent, which
the argument goes, how bad of an
worst patient outcomes—or
can complicate matters because
idea could it be for medical
perhaps not pay them at all. If
any stake less than 10 percent is
publishing K-12 educational
seldom worth medical providproviders?
test scores and “on-time
ers’ time and effort. Again,
arrival” statistics is considered
though, current “pay for perfora good idea for encouraging
mance” models are not intended
local schools and airlines to
to punish physicians, but rather
improve their performance, the argument goes, how bad of
to change existing payment incentives and encourage redean idea could it be for medical providers?
signed systems and large investments in IT (e.g., electronic
medical records). So for physicians and hospitals already
looking for extra capital to make these investments, “pay for
performance” may present a one-time opportunity to have
Policy and Legal Implications
someone else finance it.
“Pay for performance” could be problematic for a couple of
reasons, observers contend, particularly for small physician
The legal underpinnings of existing “pay for performance”
practices and hospitals.28 First, it could encourage gaming
programs are similar to those of the predominant financial
on the part of hospitals and physicians, whereby they concontracts that determine risks and rewards between medical
sciously or unconsciously favor taking healthier, more eduproviders and medical purchasers (employers and health
cated and affluent patients with the highest probability of
plans). The most common programs provide a pure bonus to
successful outcomes.29 Under this “rich get richer, while the
those providers that meet performance targets.35 Some “pay
poor get poorer” scenario, “pay for performance” might
for performance” programs, however, are more aggressive
unfairly penalize physicians who care for sicker and less
and withhold—thereby putting at risk—a proportion of conaffluent patients.30 Donald Berwick, founder of the Institute
tracted payments to medical providers unless they meet perfor Healthcare Improvement and one of the leading voices
formance targets.36 Key to the design and implementation of
for raising standards of medical quality, supports performany “pay for performance” program is health plans’ contracance-based models for hospitals and health systems, but he
tual bargaining with medical providers over performance or
is skeptical of their value at the individual physician-level.31
quality criteria and bonus structures. The U.S. Department
Second, many older patients have multiple chronic condiof Justice and the Federal Trade Commission regulate the
tions with different clinical practice guidelines [CPGs],
extent to which physicians and hospitals can form networks
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to collectively bargain with health plans without violating
U.S. antitrust laws.37 Yet these regulations, which allow
providers to form networks as long as they represent no
more than approximately a quarter of all the providers in
their relevant geographic market, only provide protection
from federal investigation.38 Private parties and state regulators are free to initiate their own antitrust claims.
The prevalence of “pay for performance” reimbursement is
growing,39 largely as a result of employers’ intense efforts to
limit their health care cost inflation.40 Most of the areas that
it targets are primary care and, thus, are likely to improve
patient outcomes,41 although early experience with “pay for
performance” has been less than impressive in terms of dramatically improving health care quality.42 The majority of
measures that “pay for performance” models use to determine bonus payments target the underuse of care. As a
result, when adopted, they usually increase health spending.43 “Pay for performance” also appears to be well-suited
for treating patients with chronic conditions, such as diabetes, heart disease, and hypertension.44 As a dominant reimbursement model, though, it is still years away.
Yet if Medicare eventually shifts the bulk of its reimbursement to various forms of “pay for performance,” as many of
its current leaders want to do,45 the medical landscape would
change rapidly. Medicare is the “800-pound gorilla” of
American medicine. When it moves, virtually all other
stakeholders in the U.S. health care system are forced to
adjust their behavior to varying degrees.46 Several senior
Medicare officials are particularly enthusiastic about “pay
for performance,” because upwards of 80 percent of the program’s beneficiaries have at least 1 chronic condition, and
30 percent have 4 or more. The latter group drives almost 80
percent of Medicare’s total spending.47 Any new reimbursement system that can improve the health of these patients
with multiple chronic conditions creates the potential for
significant cost savings. Medicare is currently experimenting with a number of hospitals that have voluntarily agreed
to participate in a program that rewards top performing hospitals by increasing their payment for Medicare patients.48
Ultimately, the medical community should prepare to play a
very proactive role in determining precisely how “performance” and “quality” will be measured and, thus, how this
new form of reimbursement can best improve both patient
safety and health care delivery (not health plans’ financial
well-being). It is an old cliché, but when it comes to “pay for
performance” reimbursement, the “devil will most certainly
be in the details.”
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